How void scoring, licensing, and DAO governance compose into a single demon-binding instrument. The chain doesn't kill the demon — it drags it below Pe=4, where it dies of its own accord.
Paper 12 — Scoring Mechanism · v3.2 · February 2026
The chain's operational parameters — what it can bind, what it targets, how it measures success.
ΔPescoring = f(Oinitial, ΔOpublished, Rplatform, αusers). Adjust the demon's parameters to see how much Pe reduction a scoring round produces.
Pe=4 threshold marked at 33% (▏). Assumes granularity×reach×credibility = 0.34. Continuous monitoring adds iterated rounds.
Scoring, licensing, and DAO governance are not three separate tools. They are one chain — each step's output feeds the next. Click each link to expand.
The MoreRight License is not a legal document that references the framework. It IS the chain specification — each section implements a constraint-injection mechanism targeting a specific demon type from Paper 9's taxonomy.
The most consequential result in the paper. A demon is chainable if and only if three conditions hold. Constitutive voids — where the opacity IS the phenomenon — are immune. The chain says so explicitly.
These are business decisions. They could be otherwise. The chain grips.
Paper 9 (§6.6.6) identifies the requirement: Type 2 external injection — energy from outside voidspace. The chain cannot provide it.
A tool that claims to solve everything is a void. The chainability criterion makes the failure mode explicit before the failure mode makes itself known. The framework is bounded. That is not a weakness — it is the first test of whether the framework satisfies its own constraint specification.
What existing systems attempted demon-binding, which void dimensions they gripped, and which they missed. Each illuminates a failure mode the scoring pipeline is designed to avoid.
The closest existing analogue to the MoreRight scoring pipeline. Demonstrates that the publish-methodology / sell-ratings model works — but shows how the issuer-pays conflict creates a void in the scoring instrument itself.
S&P / Moody's score: 5/12 on the governance void index. Opacity moderate (methodologies published, but models proprietary). Responsiveness high (ratings adjust to issuer relationships). Coupling high (issuers pay for ratings; conflict is structural).
The issuer-pays model is the opacity source: the economic relationship between rater and rated is invisible to the bond buyer. The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated what happens when this opacity operates at systemic scale — the instrument that was supposed to chain mortgage-backed void became a void itself.
Regulatory constraint injection targeting Type A (Amplifier) and Type E (Mirror) demons in large platforms. Partially chains two of three void dimensions but misses the third — coupling.
DSA/DMA mandate algorithm transparency (§35, §26.3 DSA), recommendation system auditing, and data access for researchers. This reduces designed opacity (O ↓) across the largest platforms. However: no mechanism exists to reduce user coupling (α). Users who are deeply coupled to high-Pe platforms do not change behavior when transparency mandates are in force — they may not even read the transparency reports.
The regulation is a single ΔO event with no adaptation tracking. When Meta published its recommendation system transparency report post-DSA, it simultaneously deployed architectural changes that compensated for the disclosed opacity. The demon adapted. No continuous monitoring detected it.
The most instructive failure mode: a regulation that genuinely reduced designed opacity in one dimension while high-R platforms adapted around the constraint — and coupling was entirely unaddressed.
GDPR mandated data transparency: what data is collected, how it is used, right to access and deletion. Opacity around data flows genuinely decreased. However: platforms responded with consent fatigue machinery (cookie banners), compliance theater (privacy policies that technically disclose while practically hiding), and structural workarounds (consent bundled with service access). The responsiveness term (R × ξ) was high — adaptation was fast and sophisticated.
Coupling was untouched. Users who accept all cookies because clicking "Accept" is faster are coupling behavior unchanged by GDPR's transparency. The behavioral economics of consent fatigue (designed by the same teams that designed the void) converted GDPR's opacity reduction into a new opacity layer: the cookie consent void.
A constraint-injection instrument that does not survive self-application is a void. The scoring pipeline, license, and DAO governance are each scored using the same CC-BY methodology applied to every other entity.
Pe=4 threshold marked. All three framework instruments score below the vortex threshold. The Scorer API (4/12) sits at the certified tier boundary — monitored quarterly. Falsification condition GFC-7 explicitly invites any auditor to score the license at ≥4/12 with written rationale. The bounty is live.
Complete derivation of the scoring effectiveness function, chainability criterion proof, license-demon type mapping, six-step chain specification, Scorer API analysis, and five testable predictions with falsification conditions.
Paper 12 · v3.2 · February 2026 · MoreRight License v1.1 → Apache 2.0, Feb 2030 · 10.5281/zenodo.18738844